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Presently, classical optical communication systems employing strong laser pulses and quantum
key distribution (QKD) systems working at single-photon levels are very different communication
modalities. Dedicated devices are commonly required to implement QKD. In this paper, we pro-
pose a scheme which allows classical communication and QKD to be implemented simultaneously
using the same communication infrastructure. More specially, we propose a coherent communica-
tion scheme where both the bits for classical communication and the Gaussian distributed random
numbers for QKD are encoded on the same weak coherent pulse, and decoded by the same coherent
receiver. Simulation results based on practical system parameters show that both deterministic
classical communication with a bit error rate of 10−9 and secure key distribution could be achieved
over tens of kilometers single mode fibers. It is conceivable that in the future coherent optical com-
munication network, QKD is operated in the background of classical communication at a minimal
cost.a
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most practical applications of quantum in-
formation science is the so-called quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD) protocol, which allows two remote parties,
normally referred to as Alice and Bob, to generate a se-
cure key through an insecure quantum channel [1–6]. The
generated key can be further applied in other crypto-
graphic protocols to enhance communication security.
In the first QKD protocol, the Bennett and Brassard
1984 (BB84) QKD protocol [1], information is carried
by single-photon signals. Due to the channel loss and
other implementation imperfections, those single-photon
signals are detected in a probabilistic fashion with a rel-
atively high quantum bit error rate (QBER) in the or-
der of 10−2 [7]. This is in sharp contrast to a classi-
cal optical communication system, where information can
be transmitted deterministically in an almost error-free
fashion. Furthermore, specialized devices, such as single
photons detectors, are typically required in QKD. This
makes QKD a very different communication modality in
comparison with classical communication.
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More recently, continuous-variable (CV) QKD proto-
cols based on optical coherent detection have been pro-
posed and demonstrated as viable solutions [8–11]. In
an optical coherent receiver, a strong laser pulse called
local oscillator (LO) is mixed with the incoming signal
at a beam splitter. The resulting interference signal is
strong enough and can be detected using highly efficient
photo-diodes working at room temperature. The strong
LO also acts as a natural and extremely selective filter,
which can effectively suppress broadband noise photons
generated in the communication channel. This intrin-
sic filtering function is especially useful when conducting
QKD over a noisy channel, such as a lit fiber in a conven-
tional fiber optic network [12, 13] or a free-space optical
link [14].
One well-known CV-QKD protocol is the Gaussian-
modulated coherent states (GMCS) protocol [10], which
has been demonstrated over 100km telecom fiber [15] and
in a real-world CV-QKD network [16]. The hardware re-
quired for implementing the GMCS QKD is surprisingly
similar to that for classical coherent optical communica-
tion [17]. In fact, recent progresses in both communities
have significantly reduced the gap between them. On
one hand, the continuous improvement of detector perfor-
mance and the development of forward-error-correction
coding in classical coherent communication allows a bit
error rate (BER) of 10−9 with only a few photons per
bit [18]. On the other hand, CV-QKD protocols based
on discrete modulation scheme, which are similar to the
binary phase-shift keying (BPSK) and the quadrature
phase-shift keying (QPSK) in classical communication,
have been proposed [19, 20]. It is feasible to use the same
communication infrastructure for either classical commu-
nication or QKD in a time-sharing manner.
In this paper, we go one step further by showing it is
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2possible to conduct classical communication and QKD si-
multaneously. As a specific example, we propose a coher-
ent communication scheme where both the bits for classi-
cal communication and the Gaussian distributed random
numbers for GMCS QKD are encoded on the same weak
coherent pulse, and decoded by the same coherent re-
ceiver. Such a scheme could be appealing in practice,
where random numbers for QKD are superimposed on
classical communication signals, and secure key distribu-
tion is conducted in the background of classical commu-
nication at a minimal cost.
Our protocol is a special case of the more general con-
cept of simultaneous transmission of classical and quan-
tum information [21, 22]. The trade-off relations for pub-
lic communication, privacy communication and secure
key generation have been derived in [22] assuming no
feedback from the receiver to the sender. It could be in-
teresting to extend the results in [22] to the GMCS QKD
using reverse reconciliation.
This work is partly inspired by [23], where the authors
propose improved schemes to implement CV-QKD using
a locally generated LO [24–26]. One scheme proposed
in [23] is to estimate the phase difference between two
remote lasers by sending Gaussian modulated coherent
states displaced in phase space. In our scheme, we en-
code classical information on the displacements of QKD
signals.
This paper is organized as follows: in Section II, we
present details of the proposed protocol. In Section III,
we conduct numerical simulations based on practical sys-
tem parameters. Finally, we conclude this paper with a
discussion in Section IV.
II. DETAILS OF THE NEW PROTOCOL
For simplicity, in this paper we assume the BPSK
scheme and the GMCS protocol are adopted in classical
communication and QKD, correspondingly. The basic
idea should be applicable in other encoding schemes.
A. Classical coherent communication using BPSK
In the BPSK modulation scheme, the classical binary
information is encoded on the phase of a coherent state,
and decoded by performing optical homodyne detection.
More specifically, the bit value mA (mA = 0, 1) is en-
coded by |e−imApiα〉, as shown in Fig.1(a). Without loss
of generality, we assume α is a real number. The aver-
age photon number µ of the coherent state is given by
µ = α2.
We assume that the X-quadrature of the signal is mea-
sured by the receiver. The probability distribution of the
measurement result xc is shown in Fig.1(a) (right fig-
ure). The receiver can decode binary information using
the sign of xc, i.e., if xc > 0 (< 0), the bit value is as-
signed as “0” (“1”). The BER of the BPSK scheme is
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FIG. 1: Phase space representations of various coherent
communication schemes. (a) Classical BPSK scheme.
(b) GMCS QKD scheme. (c) The proposed scheme.
The figures on the right show the probability
distributions of X-quadrature measurement.
determined by the measurement error variance σ and the
signal amplitude α, and is given by [17]
BER =
1
2
erfc(
√
Tchηα√
2σ
) (1)
where Tch is the channel transmittance, η is the detection
efficiency, and erfc(*) denotes the complementary error
function. If the homodyne detector is shot-noise lim-
ited (the technical noise is much lower than the vacuum
noise), then σ is about 1/4. From (1), we need about 9
photons per bit at the receiver’s end to achieve a BER of
10−9.
B. GMCS QKD
In GMCS QKD, Alice prepares coherent states |xA +
ipA〉 and sends them to Bob through a quantum chan-
nel. Here xA and pA are Gaussian random numbers with
zero mean and a variance of VAN0, where N0 = 1/4 de-
notes the shot-noise variance. In this paper, all the noise
variances are defined in the shot-noise unit. At Bob’s
end, he can either perform optical homodyne detection to
3measure a randomly chosen quadrature [10], or perform
optical heterodyne detection to measure both quadra-
tures simultaneously [27]. In this paper, our discussion is
based on the homodyne detection scheme. The essential
ideas can be extended to the other case. Fig.1(b) shows
the phase space representation of Gaussian modulated
coherent states. Given the system is shot-noise limited,
the overall quadrature variance at the receiver’s end is
(TchηVA + 1)N0.
After quantum transmission stage, Bob announces
which quadrature he measures for each incoming sig-
nal through an authenticated classical channel, and Alice
only keeps the corresponding data. If the observed noise
is below certain threshold, they can further work out a
secure key by performing reconciliation and privacy am-
plification. See more details in Section III.
C. Simultaneous classical communication and QKD
protocol
It is straightforward to combine the above two commu-
nication protocols. In this simultaneous classical commu-
nication and QKD scheme, Alice encodes her classical bit
mA and Gaussian random numbers {xA, pA} on a coher-
ent state |(xA + e−imApiα) + i(pA + e−imApiα)〉, as shown
in Fig.1(c). Note in the GMCS QKD based on homo-
dyne detection, Bob measures either X or P quadrature
of each incoming signal. To achieve deterministic classi-
cal communication, the same classical bit mA is encoded
on both X and P quadrature. If heterodyne detection
scheme is employed, then Alice only needs to encode mA
on one quadrature.
Assume Bob measures X-quadrature (P-quadrature)
and his measurement result is xR (pR). Bob determines
a classical bit mB using the sign of xR (pR), i.e., if
xR(pR) > 0, then the value of mB is assigned as “0”.
Otherwise, the value of mB is assigned as “1”. To gen-
erate secure key, the measurement result will be rescaled
and displaced based on the overall transmittance Tchη
and the value of mB as follows
xB =
xR√
Tchη
+ (2mB − 1)α
pB =
pR√
Tchη
+ (2mB − 1)α (2)
Alice and Bob can further work out a secure key from
raw keys {xA, xB} and {pA, pB}, just as in the case of
conventional GMCS QKD.
Essentially, the states prepared by Alice are displaced
Gaussian modulated coherent states, where the amount
of displacement is determined by the classical bit mA.
Given a modulation variance VA, the BER of classical
communication can be reduced effectively by increasing
the displacement α.
Next, we will show that the security proofs of the stan-
dard GMCS QKD can be applied to this new scheme. To
illustrate the essential ideas, it is convenient to represent
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(a); (c) Standard GMCS QKD.
the classical communication and QKD using two separate
channels, and allow Eve to have full access and control
of information transmitted through the classical chan-
nel, as shown in Fig.2 (a). In this picture, Bob performs
a homodyne measurement on the incoming signal, then
displaces his measurement results using classical informa-
tion mB (which could be provided by Eve). Equivalently,
Bob could perform the displacement operation first, then
perform the homodyne measurement, as shown in Fig.2
(b). Finally, if we move the displacement operation out
of Bob’s secure station and let Eve to have full control
of it (see Fig.2 (c)), then the whole system reduces to
the standard GMCS QKD, where Eve is allowed to ma-
nipulate the quantum signals transmitted through the
channel at her will. Note, in the last step, we have given
Eve additional power to control the displacement opera-
tion, so the security of the proposed scheme is at least as
strong as the standard GMCS QKD.
In next section, we conduct numerical simulations to
estimate the performance of the proposed scheme.
III. SIMULATION RESULTS
To evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme,
we conduct numerical simulations using practical system
parameters. On one hand, since the quantum signal is
superimposed on a relatively strong classical signal, we
expect that noises from the classical channel will be cou-
pled into the quantum channel and reduce the QKD per-
formance. On the other hand, the Gaussian modulation
in QKD will also appear as a noise source in classical
4communication channel.
We first evaluate the performance of the classical com-
munication. The main noise sources in classical channel
are: (1) the vacuum noise with a variance of one; (2)
the detector noise denoted by νel; and (3) the Gaussian
modulation for QKD with a variance of VA. All the above
noises are defined in the shot-noise unit and are assumed
to be independent Gaussian noises with zero mean. Note
the first two are defined at the receiver’s side, while the
third is defined at the sender’s side. As we will show
below, to achieve a positive key rate in QKD, the ex-
cess noise due to phase instability and other modulation
imperfections should be much smaller than the vacuum
noise. So we neglect the phase noise in classical commu-
nication.
We assume the communication channel is optical fiber
with an attenuation coefficient of γ. The channel trans-
mittance is given by
Tch = 10
−γL
10 (3)
where L is the fiber length.
From (1), the BER of classical communication is given
by
BER =
1
2
erfc(
√
Tchηα√
2(TchηVA + 1 + νel)N0
) (4)
To achieve a BER of 10−9 in the classical channel, the
required displacement α is
α = 4.24×
√
TchηVA + 1 + νel√
2Tchη
. (5)
We conduct numerical simulation to calculate the re-
quired displacement α as a function of the fiber length
using (5). Simulation parameters are VA = 4, γ = 0.2
dB/km, η = 0.5, νel = 0.1. The simulation results are
shown in Fig.3.
Fig.3 shows that α2 ≥ (VA + 1)N0 for a typical VA in
the range of 1 to 20. The presence of this relatively large
displacement not only requires a large dynamic range of
the detector, but also makes the QKD performance more
sensitive to the phase noise. We will study these issues
in details below.
The expected quadrature distribution at the receiver’s
end is shown in Fig.4, where α′ =
√
Tchηα is the reduced
displacement at receiver’s end and VB = (TchηVA+ 1)N0
is the expected variance associated with the Gaussian
modulation. Due to the finite dynamic ranges of electri-
cal amplifiers and Analog to Digital Converter (ADC),
a practical homodyne detector only has a limited linear
response range [−xm, xm], within which the output sig-
nal is propositional to the quadrature value of the input
signal [28, 29]. For simplicity, we assume the output of
the homodyne detector is either xm or −xm if the input
signal is beyond the linear range. The excess noise due to
the finite measurement range of the detector is denoted
FIG. 3: Simulation results of the required displacement
α to achieve a BER of 10−9 in the classical channel.
Simulation parameters: VA = 4, γ = 0.2 dB/km,
η = 0.5, νel = 0.1.
by εc, which is given by
εc =
1
N0
√
2piVB
∫ −xm
−∞
(x+ xm)
2e
− (x−α′)22VB dx
+
1
N0
√
2piVB
∫ ∞
xm
(x− xm)2e−
(x−α′)2
2VB dx. (6)
Furthermore, due to the finite resolution of the ADC,
we expect a quantization noise variance given by
εd =
1
N0
[
0.5× xm − (−xm)
2M
]2
(7)
where M is the number of bits of the ADC.
To estimate the magnitudes of εc and εd in a prac-
tical setup, we assume that the dynamic range of the
homodyne detector is 30 dB, corresponding to a practi-
cal 10-bit ADC (M = 10). Other system parameters are
assumed to be VA = 4, γ = 0.2 dB/km, η = 0.5, and
xm = 10. Using (5)-(7), εc and εd have been determined
to be 4.4×10−9 and 3.8×10−4, which are negligible com-
paring with the electrical noise of the detector (typically
in the order of 10−2 to 10−1).
Next, we estimate the impact of phase noise which
commonly exists in a coherent communication system.
Under the assumption of α2 ≥ (VA + 1)N0, the excess
noise due to phase instability can be estimated by
εp =
α2σφ
N0
(8)
where σφ is the phase noise variance. Note σφ can include
both the phase noise between the signal and the LO, and
other modulation errors.
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FIG. 4: The expected quadrature distribution at the
receiver’s end. α′ =
√
Tchηα; the variance of the
Gaussian distribution is VB = (TchηVA + 1)N0; the
linear range of the homodyne detector is [−xm, xm].
We define the overall excess noise outside of Bob’s sys-
tem as
ε = εp + ε0 (9)
where ε0 quantifies the excess noise independent of α.
For more detailed studies on various noises in CV-QKD,
see [23, 30–32].
To estimate the secure key rate of QKD, we adopt the
“realistic” model [10] where one crucial assumption is
that Eve cannot control the noise and loss inside Bob’s
system (νel and η). This “realistic” model has been
widely adopted in long distance CV-QKD experiments
[10, 11, 13, 15, 30, 31].
The asymptotic secure key rate, under the optimal
collective attack, in the case of reverse reconciliation, is
given by [31]
R = fIAB − χBE (10)
where IAB is the Shannon mutual information between
Alice and Bob; f is the efficiency of the reconciliation
algorithm; χBE is the Holevo bound of the information
between Eve and Bob. We remark a composable security
proof against arbitrary attacks has been developed for
GMCS QKD based on the heterodyne detection scheme
[33]. Unfortunately, the existing security proof cannot
produce a positive key rate for a reasonable data size
[34]. Here, we adopt the security analysis given in [31]
to facilitate the comparison with previous experimental
results.
The mutual information between Alice and Bob is
given by [10]
IAB =
1
2
log2
V + χtot
1 + χtot
(11)
The Holevo bound of the information between Eve and
Bob is given by [31]
χBE =
2∑
i=1
G
(
λi − 1
2
)
−
5∑
i=3
G
(
λi − 1
2
)
(12)
where G(x) = (x+ 1)log2(x+ 1)− xlog2x
FIG. 5: Simulation results based on security analysis
given in [31]. Simulation parameters: γ = 0.2 dB/km;
ε0 = 0.01; νel = 0.1; VA = 4; η = 0.5; f = 0.95; and
σφ=10
−3 (solid line), 10−4 (dash line), 10−5 (dot line)
and 10−6 (dash dot line).
λ21,2 =
1
2
[
A±
√
A2 − 4B
]
(13)
where
A = V 2(1− 2Tch) + 2Tch + T 2ch(V + χline)2 (14)
B = T 2ch(V χline + 1)
2 (15)
λ23,4 =
1
2
[
C ±
√
C2 − 4D
]
(16)
where
C =
Aχhom + V
√
B + Tch(V + χline)
Tch(V + χtot)
(17)
D =
√
B
V +
√
Bχhom
Tch(V + χtot)
(18)
λ5 = 1 (19)
System parameters in the above equations are defined
as follows:
(a) V = VA + 1.
(b) The total noise referred to the channel input χtot =
χline +
χhom
Tch
.
6(c) The total channel-added noise referred to the chan-
nel input χline =
1
Tch
− 1 + ε.
(d) The detector-added noise referred to Bob’s input
χhom = [1− η + νel]/η.
We conduct numerical simulations of secure key rate at
different phase noise variances. Other simulation param-
eters are: γ = 0.2 dB/km, ε0 = 0.01, νel = 0.1, η = 0.5,
f = 0.95, and VA = 4. Fig. 5 shows the simulation re-
sults. The performance of the proposed scheme is heav-
ily dependent on the phase noise of the system. The ob-
served phase noises in previous CV-QKD experiments are
in the orders of 10−3 [30], 10−4 [31], and 10−6 [15], sug-
gesting simultaneous classical communication and QKD
over tens of kilometer optical fiber is possible.
IV. DISCUSSION
One major roadblock to the wide applications of QKD
is the high implementation cost. Presently, dedicated
hardware are required to implement QKD protocols. In
this paper, we show that by using optical coherent de-
tection, classical communication and QKD could be im-
plemented simultaneously on the same platform. Our
simulation results suggest that the QKD performance is
largely determined by the phase noise of the coherent
communication system. To extend the distance of QKD,
sophisticate phase stabilization scheme may be required.
In our simulation, an uncoded BPSK scheme is as-
sumed for classical communication. In modern optical
communication systems, forward error correction (FEC)
schemes are commonly used to achieve high accuracy of
data transmission with the minimum of optical power
[35]. For example, by applying FEC coding, a BER of
10−9 was achieved at a signal power of 1.5 photons per
pulse [18]. In comparison, an uncoded BPSK system re-
quires at least 9 photons per pulse to achieve the same
BER. As shown in (8), the excess noise due to the phase
instability is proportional to the optical power in classi-
cal channel. By applying FEC coding, the excess noise in
QKD can be further reduced. This can lead to a better
secure key rate or a longer distance.
To apply our scheme in practice, there are important
challenges to be addressed.
First, in our simulation, the secure key rate is calcu-
lated based on a security proof against collective attacks
in the asymptotic limit of infinitely large data size. In
practical applications, a composable security against ar-
bitrary attacks is required. Unfortunately, the existing
composable security proof techniques cannot produce a
positive key rate for a reasonable data size [34]. This is
a significant challenge not only to our scheme but also
to all CV-QKD protocols based on coherent states. As
remarked by the authors of [34], finding better security
proofs allowing composable security for reasonable data
size “is certainly the most pressing issue in the theoretical
study of CVQKD”.
Second, while today’s classical communication systems
can be operated at 10 to 100 GHz repetition rate, the
highest repetition rate demonstrated in CV-QKD exper-
iments is only 100 MHz [26]. To implement the simulta-
neous classical and quantum communication protocol, we
either have to sacrifice the speed of the classical commu-
nication, or need to develop high-speed (above 10 GHz)
shot-noise limited homodyne detectors. We remark that
the speed of shot-noise limited homodyne detectors has
been improved significantly over the years. A 1 GHZ
shot-noise limited homodyne detector has been applied
in a recently CV-QKD experiment [26]. We expect this
trend will continue in the future and the gap between the
repetition rates of classical and quantum communications
may eventually disappear.
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